Command Leadership Programs

A single blueprint for a leadership program cannot fit every command. Programs must be custom built; however, the following key points are applicable to all leadership programs:
• Each command must want to improve its leadership.
• Each command must consider its needs, capabilities and mission.
• Each command must ensure overall consistency. A common approach which can be carried out by successive commanding officers is provided by General Order 21. It provides both the stimulus and the guidelines for a balanced program.
• Each command should seek to improve in all the areas—inspira tional, technical, and moral—and should not be satisfied until tangible improvements have been observed in each of these areas.
A command program should motivate or inspire people to lead and also provide for the practice of leadership at all levels. Although a program can be separated into a motivation phase and an action phase to facilitate its planning and implementation, the two phases should operate concurrently to achieve success. Emphasis may be shifted from one phase to the other to compensate for turnover in people and the changes in operation and material or to relieve pressing command problems.

The First Component of Naval Leadership

According to Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, “The first component of Naval leadership is personal example. Your subordinates will reflect your sincerity, enthusiasm, smart appearance, military behavior, technical competence, and coolness and courage under stress.

To be an effective leader you must first look and act like one.” Perry instinctively understood this principle.

“The commodore was blunt, yet dignified. . . heavy and not graceful. . . held in awe by the junior officers and having little to do with them, seriously courteous to others. . . The ship seemed to have a sense of importance because he was on board.”


From LEADERSHIP EMBODIED, Chapter 7, Mathew Calbraith Perry by Dr. Michael J. Crawford

Good Writing

Why do I love good writing? 

Namely, because “good writing,” defined broadly, picks up much of what junior officers fret about. A well-prepared brief for the Commanding Officer reflects the junior officer’s ability to read Navy messages & instructions, choose the important issues, cull the relevant facts, apply thought in a logical way, and then persuade. 
Thus, a Commanding Officer’s insistence on “good writing,” broadly defined, is simply insisting on good officership.

Maintaining the Momentum – From the OPNAV N2N6

Get the full scoop.  Check with your leadership for the August 2013 IDC Newsletter.
Information Dominance Corps –


Let me begin by saying how pleased and honored I am to be a member of the IDC. This is an opportunity of a lifetime and I couldn’t be more excited about the challenges we face together. Although primarily a consumer of your products and services for the bulk of my career, I have been thoroughly impressed with the technical talent and professionalism I’ve seen over the last two months; I truly believe the IDC is on the cutting edge of warfighting in the Information Age.
Starting with a superb turnover from VADM Card and continuing through my first few  weeks on the job, my experience so far has confirmed for me that Information Dominance is a new center of gravity for the Navy. I’ve examined each of the Information Dominance strategies cover to cover; they are solid, forward-leaning, and match the CNO’s core tenets very well. I’ve met individually with the CNO, the Vice Chief, and Admiral Gortney; each has an undeniably clear view of Information Dominance as a force multiplier, and each has high expectations with respect to your crucial role in it. I’ve conferred with most of the flag and senior executive leaders of the IDC, and shared my principal goals: 1) Realize the Information Dominance Strategy, and 2) Shape the IDC with a warrior ethos to match its position as Navy’s newest warfighting pillar.

Make no mistake. We are at the dawn of a new age of warfare—everything we do is about warfighting. I am thrilled to be a part of this outstanding team and I greatly look forward to advancing the Navy’s Information Dominance agenda with you. 

VADM Ted Branch

Poor Command Climate Results in CO Firing

Captain Kevin Knoop, the commanding officer of USNS COMFORT‘s medical treatment facility, was removed “after an investigation identified command climate issues and a lack of leadership engagement,” according to an MSC news release.

Rear Admiral Thomas Shannon, Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC) fired the senior naval officer aboard the hospital ship USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) on Tuesday, citing him for command climate problems and for being unengaged, according to a news release.

Gone 6 years now – NEVER forgotten

Master Chief Petty Officer Ronald N. Schwartz passed away on 27 August 2007 following a fatal tractor accident near his home in Indiana. He had a distinguished career as a Cryptologic Maintenance Technician in the Naval Security Group. He served in USS BIDDLE, in The White House Communication Office, at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Education and Training, as an instructor at Naval Technical Training Center – Corry Station – Pensacola, Florida and as Command Master Chief for U.S. Naval Security Group Activity – Yokosuka, Japan.

One of the young men he influenced there (now CTRCM Cedric Rawlinson) has taken his place as the Command Master Chief twelve years later.

He was foremost a career-long advocate for the Cryptologic Maintenance Technicians afloat and serving in the Fleet Electronic Support shops around the world. HIS MESSAGE: Never doubt the value of our Cryptologic Technicians; for the most part, theirs is a unique contribution to the Navy’s warfighting ability. That capability must be preserved for the good of the nation.

CO VFA-106 FIRED

The commanding officer of Strike Fighter Squadron 106 (VFA-106) has been fired due to an alleged affair with a female Navy civilian.

Commander Edward White was relieved on 26 August as Commanding Officer of the “Gladiators,” based out of Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia.

The Navy cited a “loss of confidence in his ability to command following the preliminary findings of an ongoing command investigation into an alleged inappropriate relationship with a female Department of the Navy civilian employee.”

Rear Admiral Michael Shoemaker, Commander, AIRLANT, made the decision to fire the CO.