Horatio Nelson, the British admiral made famous for defeating Napoleon’s navy  at the Battle of Trafalgar, had an unusual habit when at sea. He would go to the bottom deck and spend time with his most junior officers. In those days, this was just not done…an admiral socializing with the youngest ranks? It was unheard of. But Nelson didn’t go down to tell them a thing or two. He didn’t go below deck to whip them into shape. Quite the opposite. He spent time with them to get something from them. To get something they had lots of, more than any of his ranking officers: unbridled passion and blind optimism…and Nelson loved it!

The naval leader must set the example in all things.  Do you want your men to look smart?  Then you must be meticulous in your own dress.  Throw aside any non-regulation articles of uniform, refrain from wearing soiled or rumpled clothing, keep yourself clean and neat, your face shaved.  Do you want them to be courteous?  Then you must be courteous, to your juniors as well as to your seniors.  It is a rule that works both ways.  When your seniors are present with you before your men, you must be careful to do exactly the things that are expected of you.  Do you expect your men to be loyal?  Then you must be loyal, to those junior to you as well as to those who are senior.  Loyalty can never be over-emphasized.  And remember, it works both ways.

From:  The Naval Officer’s Manual

Rear Admiral Harley Cope, USN-retired

The ability of the CO and XO to work together is vitally important because their relationship impacts all aspects of the command. In superior commands the CO and XO work as a team and live up to Napoleon’s dictum that “Nothing in war is as important as an undivided command.” 

Although the CO and XO work together, the CO leads and the XO follows: there is never any doubt about who is calling the shots.  In superior commands, the XO actively supports the CO’s policies, philosophy, and procedures. This does not mean that there is always perfect agreement. Differences, though, are dealt with in private. The XO may try to convince the CO to change her mind. But once the decision is made, the XO fully supports it; he does not attempt to undermine the CO in any way. As they say in one aviation squadron, “Fight in private; support in public.”

The COs and XOs of superior commands accept that their roles are different and that they must work together to accomplish the command’s mission. The CO has the big picture; the XO, the nitty-gritty. Thus, the CO establishes policy and procedures and holds the XO responsible for implementation. Duties and responsibilities need not be the same from command to command in the same community: in fact, each CO emphasizes different areas. What is essential, though, is that these roles be clearly defined and mutually agreed to.

Most COs in superior commands meet regularly with their executive officers to discuss long-range plans, tell them about upcoming activities, and get their ideas on preparing for these activities. The XOs, in turn, keep the CO informed about how plans are being carried out and do not hesitate to raise concerns requiring the CO’s attention.

This is how it works at the Center for Information Dominance (CID) Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida and at other excellent commands throughout the Navy.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group (SSG) generates revolutionary naval warfare concepts. Revolutionary implies that the concepts would upset the existing order. Therefore, these concepts are non-consensual. The SSG focuses its efforts on warfighting concepts that appear to have great potential, but Navy organizations are currently not pursuing. In conducting this mission, the SSG is at the leading edge of the Conceptualization Phase of the Process for Naval Warfare Innovation.

Revolutionary innovation has been the key to U.S. naval supremacy. A key to past, successful innovations was the iteration of thought between operators, technologists and analysts. The operator brought “unarticulated requirements” to the table. The technologist brought emerging and existing technologies. Analysis blended the two. Only after considerable iteration did new thinking, combining the unarticulated requirement and technology, result in what became major naval warfare innovations.

Hoping that the FBI investigation may help Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus reconsider his decision to name LPD-26 USS JOHN P. MURTHA.  The contract to build the ship was awarded to Ingalls Shipyard on April Fool’s Day 2011.  Many in the Navy thought it was an April Fool’s Day joke.  Sadly,  it was not.  I am hoping that the FBI investigation will convince SECNAV to change his mind.  

There is still time to do as Former SECDEF Gates said – “Do the ‘hard right’ instead of the ‘easy wrong’.”

 “Another essential quality of leadership is integrity. Without this, real leadership is not possible. Nowadays, it seems like integrity – or honor or character – is kind of quaint, a curious, old-fashioned notion.  We read of too many successful and intelligent people in and out of government who succumb to the easy wrong rather than the hard right – whether from inattention or a sense of entitlement, the notion that rules are not for them. But for a real leader, personal virtues – self-reliance, self control, honor, truthfulness, morality – are absolute. These are the building blocks of character, of integrity – and only on that foundation can real leadership be built.”